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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOHN K. CROWLEY,
:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

Case No. 2006-0712 CA

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
CHRIS BLACK,
Defendant/Appellee.

Plaintiff/Appellant John Crowley, by and through counsel, Brian M. Barnard,
submits the following Brief of Appellant:
PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS
There are no prior or related appeals.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). The
Supreme Court has transferred the case to the Court of Appeals. Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(j).

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
A.

ATTORNEY FEE CLAIM
After trial in this matter, in its oral ruling, the trial Court denied plaintiffs request

for an award of attorney fees. The trial Court provided little explanation in its oral ruling
as to the factual or legal reason for the denial of an award of attorney fees.
Plaintiffs attorney fees request was based upon the written lease between the
parties (Exhibit "P-2" introduced at trial). The written lease, in pertinent part, provides:
ATTORNEY'S FEES: In the event that the Owner shall prevail in any
legal action brought by either party to enforce the terms hereof or relating to
the demised premises, Owner shall be entitled to all costs incurred in
connection with such action, including a reasonable attorney fee.
Plaintiff was the prevailing party because a judgment for past due rent, lost rent
and for damages to the rental property was awarded to plaintiff at trial. Plaintiff was
required to bring this law suit because of defendant's refusal to pay the last month's rent,
damage to the property beyond ordinary wear and tear, etc. At no time did defendant,
Chris Black ever admit any wrongdoing, fault, liability or debt. This action and a trial
were necessary to collect damages from defendant and to enforce the lease agreement.
Plaintiff incurred attorney fees and out of pocket expenses in excess of seven
thousand dollars ($7,000.00) in pursuit of this action. Among other items, plaintiff was
required to hire a private detective to find defendant to serve him with the summons and
complaint in this action. Based upon the written lease, plaintiff is entitled to and should
have been awarded attorney fees incurred in the successful pursuit of this action.
2

B.

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST CLAIM
In this landlord and tenant dispute, Plaintiff was awarded special damages for

unpaid rent, for lost rent, and for damage caused to plaintiffs rental property during
defendant's occupancy. All those damages are in amounts certain. All damages were
established by evidence or receipts showing payment made by plaintiff in 2001 and 2002.
In light of the nature of the damages awarded in specific amounts, plaintiff is entitled to
pre-judgment interest.
A trial court's decision to grant prejudgment interest presents a question of law.
Lvon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, P73, 5 P.3d 616 (quoting Cornia v. Wilcox. 898 P.2d 1379,
1387 (Utah 1995); Bailev-Allen Co. v. Kurzet 876 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah Ct. App. 1994);
Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.. 848 P.2d 171,177 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The
law in Utah on this issue is clear:
Where the damage is complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a
particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and figures, interest
should be allowed from that time . . . and not from the date of judgment.
On the other hand, where damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated
with mathematical accuracy, such as in the case of personal injury,
wrongful death, defamation of character, false imprisonment, etc., the
amount of the damages must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of the
fact at the trial, and in such cases prejudgment interest is not allowed.
Canyon Country Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989) (quoting First Sec. Bank
of Utah v. J.BJ. Feedvards. Inc.. 653 P.2d 591, 600 (Utah 1982)); see also Bellon v.
Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089,1097 (Utah 1991).
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With clear and specific factual information, plaintiffs special damages as
presented at trial and as found by the Court were measured by "facts and figures" or
"calculated with mathematical accuracy." See Canyon Country Store. 781 P.2d at 422.
Under these circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law, to prejudgment
interest.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFF AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEY FEES UNDER THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
PARTIES WHEN PLAINTIFF PREVAILED AT TRIAL AND WAS AWARDED THE
BULK OF THE DAMAGES CLAIMED IN HIS COMPLAINT?

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING PLAINTIFF AN AWARD OF
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON LOST RENT, EXPENSES PAID FOR REPAIRS TO
THE RENTAL PREMISES, ETC. WHEN THOSE AMOUNTS WERE EASILY
CALCULATED, FIXED AMOUNTS AND INCURRED ON A SPECIFIC DATE?
ISSUES RAISED AND CONSIDERED
The issues to be considered on appeal were raised at trial in this matter, and
resolved in the Court's oral ruling. Transcript of Trial. R. 154. The issues were raised
and considered in post-trial motions. R. 86-92; 128-129.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

ATTORNEY FEE CLAIM
"Whether attorney's fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law [that] we

review for correctness." Cache County v. Beus. 128 P.3d 63 (Ut. Ct. App. 2005) [quoting
A.K. & R Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guv. 47 P.3d 92 (Utah 2004)].
When attorney's fees are recoverable, "[t]he trial court has broad discretion in
determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, and [a reviewing court] will consider the
determination against and abuse of discretion standard." R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook. 40
P.3d 1119, 1120 (Utah 2002).
"We do, however, insist that a trial court's decision concerning a motion for
attorney's fees be supported by adequate findings." Utahns for Better Dental HealthDavis Inc. v. Davis County Comm'n. 121 P.3d 39,41 (Ut. Ct. App. 2005).
B.

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST CLAIM
"A trial court's decision to grant or deny pre-judgment interest presents a question

of law which we review for correctness." Smith v. Fairfax Realty. Inc.. 82 P.3d 1064
(Utah 2003) [quoting Cornia v. Wilcox. 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995)].
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
John Crowley filed suit against Chris Black on May 17,2002 alleging breach of
the written rental agreement by which Black had resided in a rental property belonging to
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Crowley. The complaint sought a total of $5538.00 for lost rent, damages to the property,
cost of cleaning, etc. R. 1-5. The complaint sought an award of attorney fees pursuant to
the written rental agreement. R. 1-5.
Black answered the complaint on June 13, 2002. R. 8-10.
A bench trial was held on April 4, 2006, the Hon. Glenn Iwasaki, judge presiding.
R. 80-81.
The Court ruled in favor of Crowley awarding damages in a total of $4679.26 for
lost rent, damages to the property, cost of cleaning, etc. The Court denied an award of
attorney fees under to the written rental agreement. The Court also denied plaintiffs
request for prejudgment interest. R. 130-136; 137-138. Copy attached as Exhibit.
A motion for new trial was made with regard to plaintiffs request for prejudgment
interest and the attorney fees claim. R. 86-89; 90-92.
That motion for new trial was denied. R. 128-129.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment were entered on June 26,
2006. R. 130-136; 137-138.
An extension of time as granted in which plaintiff could file an appeal. R. 141142.
An appeal was filed within the extended time. R. 143-144.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Defendant Chris Lee Black leased plaintiff John Crowley's residential property
at 8828 South Alpen Way, Sandy, Utah in July 1996 and was a tenant until approximately
December 2001. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 46:25-47 and 60:8-13 (April 4, 2006).
2. A lease agreement (Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, "P-l") executed by defendant Black
and the Crowleys' property management agency is dated July 3, 1996 and shows that a
security deposit of $925.00 was paid by defendant Black. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 56:18-57:6
(April 4, 2006); see Plaintiffs Exhibit 1.
3. The original lease agreement ("P-l"), signed by defendant Black, contains an
inventory section which indicates that on July 3, 1996, the carpet, paint and blinds in the
Alpen Way residence were all new and undamaged. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 61:22-62:11
(April 4, 2006); Plaintiffs Exhibit 1.
4. Defendant Black made a walk-through inspection of the Alpen Way property in
July, 1996, when hefirstrented it. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 64:3-5 (April 4, 2006).
5. During or after his July, 1996 inspection, defendant Black did not identify, note
nor describe any existing damages in the place designated on the lease agreement which
he signed on July 3, 1996. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 64:6-18 (April 4, 2006).
6. Ms. Nancy Ann Crowley, co-owner of the Alpen Way property with her
husband, plaintiff John Crowley, made a walk-through inspection of the entire house and
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property shortly after defendant Black commenced his tenancy, on or about July 14, 1996.
R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 47:7-18 (April 4,2006).
7. Ms. Crowley's walk-through inspection on July 14, 1996 occurred
approximately ten (-10) days after defendant Black executed the original lease agreement
and moved into the Alpen Way residence. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 57:7-13 (April 4, 2006).
8. At Ms. Crowley's July 14, 1996 inspection, she noted that the house was clean,
newly carpeted, newly painted and showed no problems or damages. R. 154, Tr. Transcr.
48:6-12 (April 4,2006).
9. At Ms. Crowley's July 14, 1996 inspection, she noted that the window blinds
throughout the house were new and in working order; all the interior doors were
undamaged; and, all lightfixtureswere present and undamaged. R. 154, Tr. Transcr.
48:13-21 (April 4,2006).
10. Douglas Reynolds is a property manager for Century 21 Real Estate and has
managed plaintiff John Crowley's property at 8828 South Alpen Way for at least five (5+)
years. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 2:21-3:25 (April 4,2006).
11. Property manager Reynolds and his employer (Century 21) manage
approximately two hundred fifty (-250) rental properties. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 30:6-7
(April 4, 2006).
12. Reynolds managed plaintiffs Alpen Way property during the tenancy of
defendant, Chris Black. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 4:1-2 (April 4, 2006).
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13. Reynolds prepared a renewal lease agreement dated October 1, 1997
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 2, "P-2" ), by which defendant Chris Black continued to lease from
plaintiff, John Crowley, the home and property located on Alpen Way. R. 154, Tr.
Transcr. 5:5-16 (April 4, 2006).
14. The renewed lease agreement ("P-2") in October 1997 required that the Alpen
Way property would be left in the same condition he received it absent normal and
ordinary wear and tear. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 63:16-64:2 (April 4, 2006); see Plaintiffs
Exhibit 2.
15. The October 1997 lease provides that upon termination of the lease, defendant
Black was to surrender the premises "in as good of condition as received, normal wear
and tear excepted." R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 6:16-18 (April 4, 2006); see Plaintiffs Exhibit 2.
16. The lease provides that defendant Black was to "maintain any surrounding
grounds ... and keep the same clear of rubbish or weeds." R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 6:23-25
(April 4, 2006); see Plaintiffs Exhibit 2
17. The lease agreement includes a space designated for the identification of
existing problems or defects. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 7:4-8 (April 4, 2006); Plaintiffs
Exhibit 2.
18. Defendant Black did not identify any existing problems at the time the 1997
lease agreement was signed. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 7:15-17 (April 4, 2006).
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19. Defendant Black made no mention of any persistent water leaks or other
damage issues in the October 1997 lease agreement renewal (Exhibit "P-2"), executed
over one (1+) year into his tenancy at the Alpen Way property. R. 154, Tr. Transcr.
96:12-17 (April 4, 2006); see Plaintiffs Exhibit 2.
20. Plaintiff John Crowley and his wife, Nancy Ann Crowley ("the Crowleys")
maintain records regarding leases, tenant complaints and repairs for each rental property
they own, including the Alpen Way property. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 48:24-49:13 (April 4,
2006).
21. The Crowleys have no record of any complaints or repair requests from Black
relating to the Alpen Way property during the tenancy of defendant Black. R. 154, Tr.
Transcr. 49:14-18 (April 4, 2006).
22. Defendant Black's tenancy was one in which very few maintenance problems
were reported to property manager Reynolds. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 27:2-16 (April 4,
2006).
23. Black's rent payments during his tenancy were consistently late. R. 154, Tr.
Transcr. 49:23-50:2 (April 4, 2006).
24. Defendant Black vacated the leased premises in approximately November of
2001. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 8:2-5 (April 4, 2006).
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25. Defendant Black failed to pay rent during and for the last month of his
tenancy, November 2001. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 29:21-30:2 9 (April 4, 2006); R. 154, Tr.
Transcr. 66:15-16 (April 4, 2006).
26. Defendant Black did not leave a forwarding address with the property
manager upon vacating the premises. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 30:3-5 (April 4, 2006).
27. Property manager Reynolds visited the vacated property within days of
defendant Black's move out. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 8:6-8 (April 4, 2006).
28. When defendant Black vacated the Alpen Way property, window blinds in the
master bedroom, the kitchen and a basement bedroom were broken. R. 154, Tr. Transcr.
65:1-66:4 (April 4,2006).
29. When defendant Black moved out, there were holes in some interior doors
caused by moving furniture and holes in some basement walls caused by pool cues. R.
154, Tr. Transcr. 66:5-14 (April 4, 2006).
30. Black left behind a lot of trash and debris in the yard. R. 154, Tr. Transcr.
8:12-13 (April 4, 2006).
31. The debris left in the yard included auto wheels, tires and assorted trash. R.
154, Tr. Transcr. 9:2-4 (April 4, 2006).
32. During the post-move out inspection, property manager Reynolds took
photographs (Plaintiffs Exhibit 3, "P-3") to document damages to the house. R. 154, Tr.
Transcr. 9:20-10:5 (April 4, 2006).
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33. Photographs of damage to sheet rock walls show holes that necessitated
repairs such as patching and painting. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 10:22-11:8 (April 4, 2006);
see Plaintiffs Exhibit 3.
34. The damages to sheet rock walls are chargeable as tenant damages and are
beyond ordinary wear and tear. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 11:2 and 11:8 (April 4, 2006).
35. Photographs of interior doors show damage which necessitated the
replacement of several doors. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 11:10-11:17 and 12:20-23 (April 4,
2006); Plaintiffs Exhibit 3.
36. The damage to several interior doors and their replacement are chargeable as
tenant damages and are beyond ordinary wear and tear. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 12:22-23 and
13:3-5 (April 4, 2006).
37. Photographs of a shower unit located in the basement show severe damage
such as broken tiles, cracked tiles and a shower door wrenched loose from the frame. R.
154, Tr. Transcr. 8:17-22 and 13:7-16 (April 4, 2006); Plaintiffs Exhibit 3.
38. The damaged basement shower unit had to be completely rebuilt, including
new tile and a new floor pan. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 13:14-17 (April 4, 2006).
39. The cost of repair and complete rebuilding of the basement bathroom shower
unit ($1,580.00) was a tenant responsibility and are beyond ordinary wear and tear R.
154, Tr. Transcr. 24:5-6 and 25:9-13 (April 4, 2006).
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40. In the opinion of property manager Reynolds, the damage to the basement
shower unit and the cost of rebuilding it are chargeable as tenant responsibilities and are
beyond ordinary wear and tear. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 13:20 (April 4, 2006).
41. A photograph of a basement wall near the shower unit shows a damaged piece
of sheet rock and a poor repair attempt which necessitated installation of a new piece of
sheet rock. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 13:23-14:7 (April 4, 2006); see Plaintiffs Exhibit 3.
42. Photographs of a basement wall show water damage to paint and sheet rock
caused by a basement window being left open. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 14:9-13 (April 4,
2006); Plaintiffs Exhibit 3.
43. The water damage to the basement wall is attributable to tenant carelessness
and is a tenant responsibility and is beyond ordinary wear and tear. R. 154, Tr. Transcr.
14:14-16 (April 4, 2006).
44. Photographs of various light fixtures throughout the residence show missing
glass covers. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 15:6-9 (April 4, 2006); Plaintiffs Exhibit 3.
45. The cost of replacement parts for light fixtures are a tenant responsibility and
are beyond ordinary wear and tear. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 15:10 (April 4, 2006).
46. Photographs of vinyl window blinds show damage and the blinds had to be
replaced. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 15:12-17 (April 4, 2006); Plaintiffs Exhibit 3.
47. A photograph of the interior of the oven shows that it needed cleaning and was
not cleaned. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 15:19-16:5 (April 4, 2006); Plaintiffs Exhibit 3.
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48. A photograph of the laundry room shows piles of debris and sawdust which
were not cleaned up by the tenant. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 17:21-24 (April 4, 2006);
Plaintiffs Exhibit 3.
49. A photograph of the area below the outside deck shows debris such as auto
wheels, tires and mattresses which had to be removed before re-leasing the residence. R.
154, Tr. Transcr. 18:5-13 (April 4, 2006); Plaintiffs Exhibit 3.
50. Defendant Black admitted leaving used automobile wheels and tires and
various debris in the yard of the Alpen Way property and agreed that expenses incurred
for their removal are his responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 92:20-23 (April 4, 2006).
51. A copy of a receipt (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4, "P-4") from Daryl C Payne shows
the cost of repairs to a faulty circuit breaker and damaged wiring. R. 154, Tr. Transcr.
19:9-15 (April 4, 2006); Plaintiffs Exhibit 4.
52. The electrical repairs by Daryl C. Payne are part of regular maintenance and so
are not a tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 19:15-16 (April 4, 2006).
53. An invoice (Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, "P-5M) from Dix Keller details the painting,
debris-hauling, fixture replacement and various fix-ups which needed to be done after
defendant Black moved out. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 20:5-12 (April 4, 2006); see Plaintiffs
Exhibit 5.
54. The items and costs detailed in the Dix Keller invoice (Plaintiffs Exhibit 5,
"P-5") are tenant responsibilities. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 20:22-21:1 (April 4, 2006).
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55. A document (Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, "P-6") prepared by property manager
Reynolds identifies and reflects the costs of various repair jobs completed at the residence
by handymen. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 21:4-9 (April 4, 2006); see Plaintiffs Exhibit 6.
56. Certain items listed in this Exhibit ("P-6") such as repairing and re-staining the
front door; nailing patio ceiling; repairing the outside stairs and replacing thefrontdoor
lock sets are not chargeable to the tenant. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 21:9-22:6 (April 4,2006).
57. Other items listed in this Exhibit ("P-6") such as miscellaneous bulbs,
electrical covers and supplies are chargeable as tenant responsibilities. R. 154, Tr.
Transcr. 22:6-11 (April 4, 2006).
58. A receipt from Holbrook Plumbing (Plaintiffs Exhibit 7, "P-7") documents
repairs to the upstairs master bathroom which were not chargeable as tenant
responsibilities. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 22:20-25 (April 4, 2006); see Plaintiffs Exhibit 7.
59. A second receipt from Holbrook Plumbing (Plaintiffs Exhibit 8, "P-8")
documents repairs to the basement bathroom in which the entire shower unit had to be
rebuilt. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 23:6-13 (April 4, 2006); see Plaintiffs Exhibit 8.
60. The damages documented by the various photographs (Exhibit "P-3") and
receipts (Exhibits "P-5", P-6", "P-7" and "P-8") are of the kind that should have been
noted and described in the appropriate spaces of the lease agreement had they been
present during the defendant-tenant's initial walkthrough. All that damage was very
noticeable and obvious in 2001. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 25:23-26:4 (April 4, 2006).
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61. The opinion of property manager Reynolds was that the much of the damages
and the required repairs to the property were not the result of reasonable or ordinary wear
and tear. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 30:8-11 (April 4,2006).
62. Property manager Reynolds does not recall any issue or complaints involving
the presence of termites at the Alpen Way property. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 36:15-21 (April
4, 2006).
63. Any sawdust or unidentifiable dust-like matter on basement shelving or floors
did not descend from the ceiling inasmuch as there is no ceiling in the unfinished
basement. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 37:6-14 (April 4, 2006).
64. A water leak in the upstairs bathroom had apparently existed for the much of
defendant Black's tenancy but was not brought to property manager Reynolds' attention
until shortly before Black terminated his tenancy. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 40:7-11 and 40:1720 (April 4, 2006).
65. The upstairs bathroom leak was eventually repaired, the cost of which is not a
tenant-chargeable item. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 42:12-15 (April 4, 2006).
66. The leak in the upstairs bathroom did not cause any of the damage to the
downstairs bathroom and shower unit, the repairs in that area are chargeable as tenantcaused damage. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 42:18-43:10 (April 4, 2006).
67. Defendant Black left no forwarding address with the Crowleys upon vacating
the Alpen Way residence. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 50:3-5 (April 4, 2006).
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68. Defendant Black does not recall ever leaving a forwarding address with the
Crowleys or property manager Reynolds. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 67:13-21 (April 4, 2006).
69. After he moved out, to locate defendant Black and attempt to resolve the issue
of damages to the Alpen Way property, the Crowleys hired Paramount Detective Agency
at a cost of $400.00. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 50:6-14 (April 4, 2006).
70. After defendant Black vacated the Alpen Way residence, repairs to the
damaged property required that it remain un-leased and vacant for approximately one (-1)
month, during which no rent (at $975.00 per month) was collected. R. 154, Tr. Transcr.
50:15-23 (April 4, 2006).
71. The repairs detailed by property manager Reynolds were paid for by the
Crowleys when they were incurred and the work done. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 51;l-2 (April
4, 2006); R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 44:23-45:1 (April 4, 2006).
72. Crowley retained counsel, Brian M. Barnard and James L. Harris, Jr. and paid
legal fees to pursue the action against defendant Black. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 51:3-8 (April
4, 2006).
73. Crowley sued for reimbursement for legal fees expended in pursuing the
action against defendant Black. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 51:9-11 (April 4, 2006).
74. The front doors of the residence had consistent problems with misalignment
which prevented them from closing or locking properly; these problems existed at the
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time defendant Black began his tenancy and continued for the duration of his tenancy. R.
154, Tr. Transcr. 79:15-20 (April 4, 2006).
75. Black brought problems with the front doors to the attention of property
manager Reynolds on several occasions during his tenancy. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 37:2438:5 (April 4, 2006).
76. Defendant Black complained to property managers several times regarding the
front doors of the residence; attempts were made by property managers to correct the
problem. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 79:25-80:4 (April 4, 2006).
77. Property manager Reynolds initiated several attempts to improve the
functioning of the front doors during the tenancy of defendant Black. R. 154, Tr. Transcr.
38:5-18 (April 4, 2006).
78. Defendant Black purchased a refrigerator upon moving into the Alpen Way
residence and placed it in the kitchen; defendant Black did not remove the refrigerator
when he vacated the premises. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 88:10-16 (April 4, 2006).
79. Defendant Black paid a security deposit upon commencing his tenancy at the
Alpen Way property; his deposit was retained by Crowley. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 94:19-22
(April 4, 2006).
80. Defendant Black's complaints during his tenancy regarding the leak in the
laundry room led to successful repairs by the Holbrook Plumbing company undertaken at
the behest of property manager. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 95:12-21 (April 4, 2006).
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81. The July 3,1996 lease agreement (Exhibit "P-l") formed a contract entered
into by defendant Black and plaintiff John Crowley; the October 1997 renewal lease
agreement continued similar contractual obligations. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 98:22-99:3
(April 4,2006); see Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 and Plaintiffs Exhibit 2. R. 130-136.
82. The Court found that Defendant Black breached the lease when he failed to
pay rent for the last month of his tenancy. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 99:3-7 (April 4, 2006). R.
130-136.
83. The Court found that with regard to which damages and responsibilities are
properly attributable to the tenant and which shall be placed on the plaintiff-owners, the
testimony of property manager Reynolds was received as expert testimony given his
qualifications; the Court relied upon this testimony in making itsfindingsas to damage
apportionment. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 99:25-100:5 (April 4,2006). R. 130-136.
84. The Court found that the holes in the walls (depicted in Exhibit "P-3") are not
the result of normal wear and tear, and cost of repairs are chargeable as tenant damages
and tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 99:11-16 (April 4,2006). R. 130-136.
85. The Court found that the chipping to the walls (Exhibit "P-3") necessitated the
painting of the entire areas affected, the cost of which is chargeable as tenant damages
and tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 99:17-22 (April 4, 2006). R. 130-136.
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86. The Court found that the damage to interior doors which required their
replacement are tenant damages and tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 99:23-24
(April 4, 2006). R. 130-136.
87. The Court found that the problems with regard to the front doors (Exhibit "P3") were pre-existing and so are not tenant damage nor tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr.
Transcr. 100:5-9 (April4, 2006). R. 130-136.
88. The Court found that the damage to one interior door and the missing lock-set
there (Exhibit "P-3") are tenant damage and tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr.
100:10-12 (April 4, 2006). R. 130-136.
89. The Court found that due to conflicting testimony on the issue, the severely
damaged basement shower unit (photos of damage included in Exhibit "P-3") and the cost
of its repair and replacement (invoice included in Exhibit "P-8") should be divided
between the tenant-defendant and plaintiff-owners, to-wit: $1,200.00 to be considered
tenant responsibility, the balance of $380.00 to be borne by plaintiff-owner. R. 154, Tr.
Transcr. 100:13-19 and 103:14-16 (April 4, 2006). R. 130-136.
90. The Court found that the water damage to the basement wall caused by a
window being left open (depicted in Exhibit "P-3") is chargeable as tenant damage and
tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 100:20-22 (April 4, 2006). R. 130-136.
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91. The Court found that the damage consisting of missing light fixture covers
(Exhibit "P-3") are tenant damages and tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 100:25101:4 (April 4,2006). R. 130-136.
92. The Court found that the damage consisting of broken window blinds (Exhibit
"P-3") and the cost of replacement are partially owner and partially tenant responsibility.
R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 101:5-8 (April 4, 2006). R. 130-136.
93. The Court found that due to the absence of any complaints or notations
regarding damage to the premises in either the July, 1996 lease agreement (Exhibit "P-l")
or the October, 1997 lease agreement renewal ("Exhibit P-2"), there were no complaints
and no defects as to the condition of the premises at those times. R. 154, Tr. Transcr.
101:9-14 (April 4, 2006). R. 130-136.
94. The Court found that as to the refrigerator which defendant Black left at the
residence, the lack of any invoice relating to the purchase precludes any credit to
defendant vis-a-vis damages awarded to plaintiff; the refrigerator to be considered either
a gift to plaintiffs or abandoned property. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 101:22-102:7 (April 4,
2006). R. 130-136.
95. The Court found that the cost of repairs to a faulty circuit breaker represented
by the receipt from Daryl C. Payne (Exhibit "P-4") are not tenant damage and are not
tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 102:21-23 (April 4, 2006). R. 130-136.
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96. The Court found that the repairs represented by the Dix Keller invoice
(Exhibit "P-5"), including painting, fixture replacements, various fix-ups and debris
hauling except for the $225.00 charged for hauling away trees and shrubs, are chargeable
to Black and are tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 102:24-103:5 (April 4, 2006).
R. 130-136.
97. The Court found that the repairs represented by the receipts from various
handy-men (Exhibit "P-6") are chargeable to tenant only in the amount of $100.00 which
includes only the cost of replacing various bulbs, electrical covers and supplies; the
remaining repairs detailed therein are not tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr.
103:6-9 (April 4, 2006). R. 130-136.
98. The Court found that the repairs relating to the upstairs master bathroom
detailed in a Holbrook Plumbing receipt (Exhibit "P-7ff) are not chargeable to tenant and
are not a tenant responsibility. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 103:10-13 (April 4, 2006). R. 130136.
99. The Court found that the sheet rock patching and painting of the basement,
detailed in the Dix Keller receipt (Exhibit "P-5"), are tenant caused damages and tenant
responsibility in the amount of $1,925.00. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 104:6-20 (April 4, 2006).
R. 130-136.
100. The Court found that the total damages in repairs to the Alpen Way premises
which are chargeable to defendant-tenant Black and which are to be awarded to plaintiff-
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owner Crowley are $4,679.26. That amount does not include and plaintiff is not awarded
pre-judgment interest. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 104:21-106:18 (April 4, 2006) and Order and
Judgment T[ 2 (June 9, 2006). R. 130-136.
101. The total damages (rent, repairs, expenses, etc.) requested by plaintiff
Crowley, in terms of repairs to the Alpen Way property, were $5,538.00. R. 154, Tr.
Transcr. 105:8-12 (April 4,2006).
102. The Court orally stated that inasmuch as the damages actually awarded to
plaintiff Crowley ($4,679.26) fall short of the damages requested ($5,538.00), there is no
prevailing party under the circumstances of this case. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 106:19-23
(April 4, 2006).
103. The Court recognizes that the underlying contracts/lease agreements
(Exhibits "P-1" and "P-2") contain provision for attorneys fees and that attorneys fees are
requested by plaintiff. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 103:23-25 and 51:9-11 (April 4, 2006). Those
contracts specifically state:
In the event that the Owner shall prevail in any legal action brought by either party
to enforce the terms hereof or relating to the demised premises, Owner shall be
entitled to all costs incurred in connection with such action, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 and 2 (Lease Agreements dated July 3, 1996 and Oct. 10, 1997). R.
130-13646.
104. The Court denied any award of attorneys fees. R. 154, Tr. Transcr. 106:2224 (April 4, 2006). R. 130-136, f 27.
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105. The Court found that plaintiff is not entitled to pre-judgment interest on the
awarded money damages of $4,679.26. Order and Judgment f 1 (June 9, 2006). R. 137138.
106. The Court awarded to plaintiff damages in the amount of $4,679.26 with
post-judgment interest from April 4, 2006 as per Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (1953 as
amended) at a rate of 6.37% per annum until paid. Order and Judgment f 3 (June 9,
2006). R. 137-138.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
John Crowley sued Chris Black seeking damages for breach of a written rental
agreement. Crowley sought $5,538.00 in the Complaint. After a bench trial, the Hon.
Glenn Iwasaki, judge awarded Crowley $4,679.26 in damages.
The written rental agreement provided that Crowley as landlord and the prevailing
party in a lawsuit against the former tenant Black would be awarded attorney fees. The
trial court orally ruled there was no prevailing party. The trial court refused to award
attorney fees to Crowley. The trial court made insufficient findings to justify the denial
of an award of attorney fees.
Crowley was the successful party to the litigation; he was awarded the bulk of
damages that he had sought in his complaint. Crowley was the prevailing party and the
trial court erred in not awarding attorney fees to Crowley.

24

The damages suffered by Crowley as a result of Black's mis-conduct were specific
and easily calculated with certainty when they were incurred. For instance, Crowley
presented receipts showing he paid for the necessary repairs within months of Black's
vacating the premises. Crowley sought and was entitled to prejudgment interest.
The trial court refused to award prejudgment interest to Crowley. The trial court made
insufficient findings to justify the denial of prejudgment interest.
Because damages were incurred in a certain amount and on a certain date, plaintiff
was entitled to and should have been awarded prejudgment interest. The trial court erred
in not awarding prejudgment interest.
Crowley has incurred attorney fees and court costs in the pursuit of this appeal. He
seeks and is entitled to an award of those fees and court costs.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS
LEGAL ERROR BECAUSE LOSSES INCURRED ARE PRECISE SUMS
FIXED AT A DEFINITE TIME.
A trial court's decision regarding entitlement to prejudgment interest is a question

of law, which this Court reviews for correctness and to which it will accord no deference.
Lefavi v. Bertoch. 2000 UT App. 5,123, 994 P.2d 817. Under Utah law, prejudgment
interest may be awarded to provide full compensation for actual loss. See Canyon
Country Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989). The award is proper if the loss
is fixed at a definite time and the interest can be calculated with mathematical accuracy.
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Coalville City v. Lundgren. 930 P.2d 1206, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). This Court has
explained that an award of prejudgment interest is appropriate in cases where plaintiff has
suffered damages due to the "defendant's delay in tendering an amount clearly owing
under an agreement or other obligation," Campbell Maack & Sessions v. Debrv, 38 P.3d
984, 991 (Utah Ct. App. 2001), and where plaintiff should be fairly compensated for "the
depreciating value of the amount owed over time." Lefavi v. Bertoch, supra at ^ 24.
Here, the court erred in its denial of plaintiff s request for prejudgment interest
because plaintiffs loss "is fixed at a definite time and the interest can be calculated with
mathematical accuracy." See Coalville City, supra.
First, in proceedings below, the court found that the lease agreements between
defendant Black and plaintiff Crowley formed a contract and defendant was bound to
fulfill the contractual obligations. Statement of Facts | 81, supra. The court found that
under the terms of the contract, defendant was obligated to leave plaintiffs property in
the same condition he received it, except for normal and ordinary wear and tear.
Statement of Facts \ 14,115, supra. The court also found that when defendant failed to
pay rent during November 2001, defendant breached the contract. Statement of Facts f
82, supra. Furthermore, the court found that upon vacating in November 2001, defendant
Black surrendered the premises in damaged condition beyond normal wear and tear—
constituting another breach of the contract. See Statement of Factsfflf82-101, supra.
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These breaches of the contract, and the damages resulting therefrom, can be fixed at a
definite time. Statement of Facts % 71; 82 et seq., supra.
Finally, the amount of damages incurred by Crowley due to the breach committed
by Black are in certain sums and because they originated at a definite time, interest "can
be calculated with mathematical accuracy." City of Coalville, supra. Sitting below as
fact finder, the trial court determined that upon moving out in November 2001, Black
caused damage, beyond normal wear and tear, in the amount of $ 4,679.26. Statement of
Facts Tf 100, supra. The court determined this amount after trial where plaintiff Crowley
presented the court with receipts, invoices and testimony indicating that plaintiff had
expended money repairing the residence damaged by Black. See Statement of Facts f
100, supra.
Crowley is entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of law. Plaintiffs loss is
definite and fixed as to both amount ($4,679.26) and time (November 2001). See
Statement of Facts f 100, f 71, supra. These two facts allow for the calculation of
prejudgment interest "with mathematical accuracy." See City of Coalville, supra. As
such, the court below committed legal error in denying plaintiffs request for prejudgment
interest.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED ATTORNEY FEES TO
PLAINTIFF DESPITE DEFENDANT'S CONTRACTUAL BREACH.
A. The trial court abused its discretion by finding that plaintiff was not the
prevailing party and by denying plaintiffs request for attorney fees.
"In Utah, attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or contract."

R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook. 40 P.3d 1119, 1125 (Utah 2002); quoting Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5
(1996)(attorney fees may be awarded to a prevailing party based on a written contract).
Sitting as fact finder, the trial court found that the underlying contracts/lease agreements
contain provisions for attorney fees. See Statement of Facts ]f 105, supra} However, the
trial court denied plaintiffs request for attorney's fees determining that plaintiff was not
the prevailing party and, further, that there was no prevailing party under the facts and
circumstances of this case. Statement of Facts f 106, supra. The trial court's
determination that plaintiff was not the prevailing party constitutes an abuse of discretion
and its denial of plaintiff s requested attorney's fees was erroneous.
1. Prevailing party determination.
Whether a party is the prevailing party is a question for the trial court, and depends
in large measure on the context of each case. See R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 40 P.3d

1

These contracts specifically state: "In the event that the Owner shall prevail in
any legal action brought by either party to enforce the terms hereof or relating to the
demised premises, Owner shall be entitled to all costs incurred in connection with such
action, including a reasonable attorney's fee." See Statement of Facts ^ 105, supra;
Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 and 2 (Lease Agreements dated July 3, 1996 and October 10, 1997).
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1119, 1126-27 (Utah 2002). Therefore, "it is appropriate to leave this determination to
the sound discretion of the trial court." id. Considerations for the trial court include, but
are not limited to,
(1) contractual language, (2) the number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims,
etc., brought by the parties, (3) the importance of the claims relative to each other
and their significance in the context of the lawsuit as a whole, and (4) the dollar
amounts attached to and awarded in connection with the various claims. Id.
These criteria allow for a flexible, case-by-case evaluation capable of yielding outcomes
where "both, or neither, parties may be considered to have prevailed." Id. However, in
this case, the trial court's analysis failed to adequately address the R.T. Nielson Co.
factors and failed to make the necessary findings; its determination that neither party
prevailed falls outside the controlling law.
In relatively simple cases such as this, where there are only two parties, and no
counterclaims, cross-claims, etc., "determining the 'prevailing party' for purposes of
awarding fees [can be] quite simple." Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783
P.2d 551, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Where plaintiff sues for money damages, and
plaintiff wins, plaintiff is the prevailing party; if defendant successfully defends and
avoids any adverse judgment, defendant has prevailed. Id. Regardless of whether the
trial court applies the straight-forward, simple Mountain States Broadcasting Co. analysis
or it resorts to the more in-depth R.T. Nielson Co. criteria, the result should be the same:
plaintiff Crowley successfully litigated his breach of contract claim and was awarded the
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bulk of the money damages prayed for. Thus, plaintiff Crowley was the prevailing party
below.
First, the trial court expressly found that defendant Black breached the lease
agreement by failing to pay his last month's rent (Statement of Facts f84, supra) and by
damaging the leased premises beyond normal wear and tear in the amount of $4,679.26.
Statement of Facts 1102, supra. Plaintiff Crowley's sole claim, based on defendant
Black's breach of the lease, was thus successfully litigated and yielded money damages.
Defendant Black failed to avoid an adverse judgment and brought no counterclaim. As
such, the simplified prevailing party analysis in Mountain States Broadcasting Co.. supra,
is appropriate. It premises prevailing party status on the simple determination of whether
plaintiff sued for and is awarded money damages.2 Proper analysis in the case at bar
would similarly dictate an award of a reasonable attorney fee to plaintiff Crowley. The
trial court's failure to apply this simple analysis, in spite of its findings that defendant
breached the underlying contract and that plaintiff was entitled to damages, is an abuse of
discretion.

2

In contrast to the simple nature of the case at bar, R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook,
which announced the more complex analysis and four criteria, involved a complicated
array of claims {e.g., breach of contract, account stated, breach of fiduciary duty, etc.),
counterclaims {e.g., breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, etc.)
and substantial money damages which necessitated the in-depth analysis prescribed. 40
P.3d 1119, 1127 (Utah 2002).
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Second, even though the trial court's decision3 to apply the more in-depth and
complicated analysis prescribed by R.T. Nielson Co., supra, falls within its discretion, the
trial court failed to properly apply this analysis and based its determination on an
inadequate review of the R.T. Nielson Co. factors. The R.T. Nielson Co. analysis should
include a detailed review of each of the four criteria. See Carlson Distributing Co. v. Salt
Lake Brewing Co.. 95 P.3d 1171,1181 (Utah Ct. App. 2004)(stating with approval that
"The trial court addressed the R.T.Nielson Co. factors in detail and determined that
neither party was the prevailing party.")- The court below summarily denied plaintiff
Crowley's request for attorney's fees based solely on its determination that inasmuch as
the damages actually awarded to plaintiff ($4,679.26) fell short of the damages requested
($5,538.00), there was no prevailing party. Statement of Facts f 104, supra. This
observation by the trial court comprises the entirety of its prevailing party analysis. There
were no findings of fact to support the determination. As such, there is insufficient basis
under the R.T. Nielson Co. framework to support the court's denial of attorney's fees.
Under R.T. Nielson Co.. a prevailing party determination must include analysis
including: 1) contractual language; 2) the number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims,
etc.; 3) the importance of the claims relative to each other and their significance in the
context of the lawsuit as a whole; and, 4) the dollar amounts attached to and awarded in
connection with the various claims. 40 P.3d at 1127 (Utah 2002). Here, the trial court

3

The trial court failed to indicate any legal authority upon which it relied.
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failed to mention, much less analyze, the first, second or third R.T. Nielson factors.
These failures alone render the trial court's analysis inadequate to support its prevailing
party determination, and make its denial of attorney's fees an abuse of discretion.
Properly applied, the second factor- review of the number of claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims, etc.- would lead to a finding that plaintiff Crowley brought
one claim for breach of contract which resulted in damages itemized and presented to the
court. Defendant Black brought no counterclaim. The trial court's finding that defendant
Black breached the underlying contracts (Statement of Facts f 82 et seq., f 100, supra)
means under the second factor plaintiff prevailed: plaintiff brought a breach of contract
claim and the court found that defendant breached the contract.
As to the third factor-review of the importance of the claims relative to each other
and in the context of the lawsuit as a whole— proper application yields the conclusion:
plaintiffs breach of contract claim was the only claim and was the whole lawsuit.
Inasmuch as the trial court found that defendant breached the contract (Statement of Facts
U 84,1f 102, supra), plaintiff must be the prevailing party under the third factor.
The fourth R.T. Nielson Co. factor-comparison of the dollar amounts attached to
and awarded in connection with the various claims- is the only factor touched upon by
the trial court. However, the court's bald and singular observation that the damage
amount awarded fell short of the specific amount requested (Statement of Facts % 104,
supra) is not a proper application of this factor. This Nielson factor says nothing about
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comparing damage amounts requested with damage amounts awarded with respect to a
single claim. Rather, the fourth R.T. Nielson Co. factor simply directs a review of "the
dollar amounts attached to and awarded in connection with the various claims." 40 P.3d
at 1127. The trial court could not compare various claims because there were none other
than plaintiffs one claim. Instead, the trial court erroneously compared the damages
awarded with those requested, concluding that plaintiff Crowley did not prevail because
he was not awarded all damages associated with his cause of action.4
Properly applied, this last factor would yield the conclusion that on the only claim
asserted by plaintiff (breach of contract), defendant was liable (he breached the contract)
and the damages awarded were $4,679.26. See Statement of Facts f 102, supra.
Defendant Black did not bring any counter-claim and failed to defeat the claim brought
by plaintiff. The fact that the sole claim, successfully asserted, did not yield all of the
money damages requested by plaintiff does not render the claim unsuccessful under the
fourth R.T. Nielson Co. factor. This factor weighs in favor of a finding that plaintiff
Crowley was the prevailing party.
Because the trial court failed to carry out the proper prevailing party analysis, its
ultimate conclusion that neither party prevailed represents an abuse of discretion. The
failure of the trial court to make any findings make appellate review difficult, if not

4

Had plaintiffs complaint simply prayed for damages as "to be determined at
trial" (rather than a specific amount), perhaps the trial court's analysis may have been
different.
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impossible. See Cabrera v. CottrelL 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah \9&5)(stating "an award [or
denial] of attorneys fees must generally be made on the basis of findings of fact supported
by evidence and appropriate conclusions of law."). Given the trial court's improper
prevailing party analysis and failure to make findings, the resulting denial of plaintiff
Crowley's requested attorney's fees constitutes clear legal error and should be reversed by
this Court.
Plaintiff requests an award of his attorney's fees incurred in pursuing this appeal.
Management Servs. Corp. v. Development Assoc, 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980)
(holding that a contract provision for attorney fees includes those incurred by the
prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial). The terms of the underlying contract
(Statement of Facts f 105, supra; Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 and 2 (Lease Agreements dated
July 3, 1996 and October 10, 1997)) mean that if plaintiff Crowley prevails on appeal, he
should be awarded reasonable attorney's fees including those incurred in pursuing such
appeal.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF
A.

ATTORNEY FEE CLAIM
The trial court denied plaintiffs request for an award of attorney fees. The trial

court provided little explanation in its oral ruling as to the factual or legal reason for the
denial of an award of attorney fees. The trial court prepared inadequate findings
regarding attorney fees.
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Plaintiffs attorney fees request was based upon the written lease between the
parties.
Plaintiff was the prevailing party because a judgment for past due rent, lost rent
and for damages to the rental property was awarded to plaintiff at trial.
Plaintiff incurred attorney fees in excess of seven thousand dollars ($7,000.00) in
pursuit of this action. Based upon the written lease, plaintiff is entitled to and should
have been awarded attorney fees and out of pocket expenses incurred in the successful
pursuit of this action.
B.

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST CLAIM
In this landlord and tenant dispute, Plaintiff was awarded special damages for

unpaid rent, for lost rent, and for damage caused to plaintiffs rental property during
defendant's occupancy. All those damages are in amounts certain. All damages were
established by evidence or receipts showing payment made by plaintiff in 2001 and 2002.
In light of the nature of the damages awarded in specific amounts, plaintiff is entitled to
prejudgment interest.
With clear and specific factual information, plaintiffs special damages as
presented at trial and as found by the Court were measured by "facts andfigures"or
"calculated with mathematical accuracy." Under these circumstances, the plaintiff is
entitled, as a matter of law, to prejudgment interest.
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This Court should rule that plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and prejudgment
interest.
Plaintiff should be granted his costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal.
DATED this 16th day of JANUARY 2007.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
XT7
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ATTACHMENT "A"
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Randall Gaither
Attorney for Defendant
159 West 300 South
The Broadway Lofts, # 105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

JOHN K. CROWLEY,
Plaintiff,
:

FINDINGS OF FACT &
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

Civil No.

vs.
02-090-4266 CN

CHRIS BLACK,
:

(Hon. Glenn Iwasaki)

Defendant.

The above captioned matter having come before this Court for
trial on April 4, 2006, the Hon. Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding.

The

plaintiff, John K. Crowley being present in person and being
represented by counsel, BRIAN M. BARNARD and JAMES L. HARRIS, JR.
The defendant, CHRIS BLACK, being present and being represented
by counsel RANDALL T. GAITHER.

The parties having presented

testimony and evidence anc the matter having been argued and
suomitted, the Court having reached and announced its decision.
The Court en June 9, 2006 having aer.iea plaintiff's request for a

new trial and having sustained defendant's objection to an award
of pre-judgment interest.

Based thereon and for good cause

appearing, the Court hereby makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This action involves a written residential lease entered

into and to be performed in Salt Lake County, Utah.
2.

The defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah.

3.

Plaintiff owns a home and real property located at 8828

South Alpen Way, Sandy, Utah.
4.

Plaintiff John K. Crowley and defendant, Chris Black

entered into a written lease agreement on or about October 1,
1997, by which Black leased from plaintiff the home and property
located on Alpen Way.
5.

The lease provides that upon the termination of the

lease, defendant Black was to leave the home "in good condition
as received, normal wear and tear excepted.7'
6.

The lease provides that in the event suit is commenced

and plaintiff is successful to enforce any "cerm of the lease, the
defendant shall be responsible for plaintiff's reasonable costs
including attorney fees and court costs.
7.
m

Defendant terminated the lease and vacated the premises

December 2001.

8.

Defendant did not pay the last month's rent (December

2001) owed to plaintiff in the sum of $975.00.
9.

Defendants security deposit of $925.00 should be

credited against the judgment entered against defendant.
10.

The refusal to pay last month's rent was a breach of

the lease.
11.

Upon termination of the lease, defendant failed to

leave the home in as good condition as received, normal wear and
tear excepted.
12.

That was a breach of the lease.

During the term of the lease, extensive damage occurred

to the home and premises, beyond ordinary wear and tear.

That

was a breach of the lease.
13.

The damage to the home included holes made in doors and

sheet rock, missing light fixtures and door knobs, damaged
blinds, damage to the bathrooms, etc.
14.

Plaintiff incurred costs in repairing the damage to the

home which occurred during defendant's occupancy.
15.

Plaintiff incurred costs in removing debris left by

defendant after his occupancy.
16.

Plaintiff has incurred expenses in repairs io the home

as a result of damages caused during defendant's tenancy.
17. Plaintiff incurred expense of SI,580.00 to rebuild the
shower and surrounding area of a bathroom due to damage by the

defendant.

The defendant is responsible for and should pay

$1,200.00, a portion of that expense.
18.

Plaintiff incurred expense of $1,925.00 to prepare and

paint the basement interior due to damage from the defendant.
The defendant is responsible for and shall pay said $1,925.00 of
that expense.
19.

Plaintiff incurred expense of $476.50 to replace and

stain five damaged interior doors damaged beyond repair during
the defendant's tenancy.

The defendant is responsible and should

pay said $476.50 for that damage.
20.

Plaintiff incurred expense of $100.00 to repair and

replace a sliding door.

Plaintiff incurred expense of $200.00 to

clean the premises after defendant vacated the tenancy.
Plaintiff incurred expense of $50.00 to replace two (2) broken
window blinds.

The defendant is responsible for that damage and

should pay $350.00 for those costs.
21.

Plaintiff incurred expense of $75.00 to replace missing

light fixture covers and light bulbs. The defendant is
responsible for that damage and should pay $75.00.
22.

Plaintiff incurred expense of $225.00 to haul debris

from the property left by defendant along with other yard waste
from trees, etc.
this

The plaintiff shall be responsible and bear

expense.
d

23.

Plaintiff incurred expense of $150.26 to repair and

stain the front door of the home.

The plaintiff shall be

responsible and bear this expense.
24.

The plaintiff incurred expense of $100.00 for

miscellaneous repairs, missing electric outlet covers and
supplies and $15.26 to take pictures of the damage done to the
property.

The defendant is responsible for and should pay

$115.26 for said expenses.
25.

Plaintiff incurred expense of $307.00 for plumbing

repairs to the bathrooms and kitchen.

The plaintiff shall be

responsible and bear this expense.
26.

Plaintiff lost rent during the time necessary to effect

repairs to the property.

Defendant should pay half of one

month's lost rent in the sum of $487.50.
27.

Each party shall bear their own attorneys fees.

28.

Plaintiff incurred expense of fees of $400.00 to hire a

private detective to locate defendant after he moved out and
failed to provided his new street address.

Plaintiff shall be

responsible for this expense.
29.

Any conclusion of law more appropriately a finding of

fact should be so considered and incorporated herein by
reference.

c

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant,

Chris Black.
2.

The court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of

this action.
3.

Defendant breached the lease agreement between the

parties.
4.

The damage to the property, by defendant and/or during

his tenancy, is beyond reasonable wear and tear.
5.

Defendant failed to pay last month's rent in violation

of the lease agreement.

Plaintiff is entitled to collect the

last month's rent in the amount of $975.00.
6.

Plaintiff is entitled to damages for repairs to the

property in the amount of $4,141.76.
7.

Plaintiff is entitled to a portion of lost rent during

the time necessary to effect repairs to the property in the
amount of $487.50.
8.

Each party shall bear their own attorneys fees.

Plaintiff should be awarded his courc costs pursuant to Rule
54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
9.
secun~v

The defendant should be given a S925.00 credit for his
zevos~-Z.
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10.

Plaintiff should be awarded a judgment after credit for

the security deposit for the total money damages of $4,679.26.
10.

Plaintiff should not be awarded pre-judgment interest.

11.

Plaintiff should be awarded courts costs in the sum of

$327.80.
12.

The judgment shall bear post judgment interest from

April 4, 2006 as per Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (1953 as Amended) at
a rate of 6.37% per annum.
13.

Any finding of fact more appropriately a conclusion of

law should be so considered and incorporated herein by reference.
DATED this

day of JUNE, 2006.
BY THE COURT:

/

*

/

GLENN K.' IWASAKI '
Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ATTACHMENT "B"
Final Judgment and Order

Randall Gaither
Attorney for Defendant
159 West 300 South
The Broadway Lofts, # 105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

JOHN K. CROWLEY,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

vs.
:

Civil No.

02-090-4266 CN

CHRIS BLACK,
:

(Hon. Glenn Iwasaki)

Defendant.

The above captioned matter having come before this Court for
trial on April 4, 2006, the Hon. Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding.

The

plaintiff, John W. Crowley being present in person and being
represented by counsel, BRIAN M. BARNARD and JAMES L. HARRIS, JR.
The defendant, CHRIS BLACK, being present and being represented
by counsel RANDALL T. GAITHER.

The parties having presented

testimony and evidence and the matter having been argued and
submitted, the Court having reached and announced its decision.
The Court en June 9, 2006 having denied plaintiff's motion for

new trial and having sustained defendant's objection to prejudgment interest.

The Court having previously made and entered

its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, based thereon and
for good cause appearing:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against defendant in the

amount of four thousand six hundred seventy-nine dollars and
twenty-six cents ($4,679.26), which does not include pre-judgment
interest.
2.

Plaintiff is awarded courts costs in the sum of $327.80.

3.

The judgment shall bear post judgment interest from

April 4, 2006 as per Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (1953 as amended) at
a rate of 6.37% per annum until paid.
DATED this

day of JUNE, 2006.
BY THE COURT:

GLENN K./CWASAKI
Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ER-TAN M. 3ARNA££-"--"'

Attorney for /Plaintiff

